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JOHNSON V. CALIFORNIA: A GRAYER
SHADE OF BROWN
BRANDON N. ROBINSON
INTRODUCTION
For decades, the famous school desegregation case of Brown v.
Board of Education1 and its progeny have supported the notion “that
a State may not constitutionally require [racial] segregation of public
2
facilities.” Indeed, with regard to state-mandated racial segregation,
the doctrine of “separate but equal” has long been considered dead
3
and buried. In February 2005, however, the Supreme Court of the
United States in Johnson v. California4 curiously reopened the
segregation question by replacing the post-Brown ban on racial
segregation with the strict scrutiny standard of review afforded to all
other racial classifications,5 thereby muddying the once clear doctrinal
waters.
Johnson dealt with an unwritten policy of the California
Department of Corrections (CDC), by which new correctional facility
prisoners were segregated in double cells according to race for up to
sixty days.6 During those sixty days, prison officials “evaluate[d] the
inmates to determine their ultimate placement.”7 Although the
Copyright © 2006 by Brandon N. Robinson.
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (per curiam) (citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 495)
In this case, the Court reversed the conviction of a black citizen for refusing to sit in the seats
reserved for minorities in traffic court. Id.
3. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 506 (2005) (The U.S. Supreme Court “rejected the
notion that that separate can ever be equal—or neutral—50 years ago”); see Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896) (upholding a Louisiana state law requiring separate but equal
railway cars for blacks and whites), overruled by Brown v. Bd of Educ., 347 U.S. at 494–95
(1954) (“Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding [that separate is not equal]
is rejected.”).
4. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 499.
5. Id. at 515.
6. Id. at 502.
7. Id.
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double-cell assignments were based on a number of factors including
race, the CDC conceded “that the chances of an inmate being
assigned a cellmate of another race [were] ‘[p]retty close’ to zero
8
percent.”
The CDC asserted that such a policy was “necessary to prevent
9
violence caused by racial gangs.” According to one witness, if race
were not considered in making initial housing assignments, there
would undoubtedly be “racial conflict in the cells and in the yard.”10
All other prison facilities other than the double cells in the reception
11
area were fully integrated—including dining areas, yards, and cells.
After the sixty-day holding period, “prisoners [were] allowed to
choose their own cellmates” and inmate requests to be housed
together were usually granted, barring any “security reasons” for
denial.12
Garrison S. Johnson was an African-American inmate in the
California prison system who had been housed at several California
prison facilities13 since his incarceration and arrival at Folsom prison
in 1987.14 “[E]ach time he was transferred to a new facility . . . ,
Johnson was double-celled with another African-American inmate.”15
Importantly, in deciding this case, the Johnson Court established
strict scrutiny as the proper standard of review for a policy of
temporary racial segregation in prisons, stating that “all racial
classifications” are subject to strict scrutiny.16 This decision contrasts,
however, with a long line of precedents beginning with Brown v.
8. Id. (quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3a, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499
(No. 03-636)). “[A] corrections official . . . testified that an exception to this policy was once
granted to a Hispanic inmate who had been ‘raised with Crips’. . . .” Id. at 517 n.1 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra, at 184a).
Notwithstanding this lone exception, Justice Stevens, dissenting, noted that “the CDC’s
suggestion that its policy is therefore flexible . . . strains credulity.” Id. (citation omitted).
9. Id. at 502 (majority opinion). The Brief for the Respondents cited several incidents of
racially-motivated violence in CDC facilities, identifying “five major prison gangs in the State:
Mexican Mafia, Nuestra Familia, Black Guerrilla Family, Aryan Brotherhood, and Nazi Low
Riders.” Id. (citing Brief for Respondents at 2, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (No. 03-636)).
10. Id. at 503 (citing Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 8, at 215a).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Johnson had previously “been through the inmate reception centers at Chino, Folsom,
and Calipatria, and [was] incarcerated at Lancaster” at the time of his appeal to the Ninth
Circuit. Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2003).
14. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 503.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 505 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
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17
Board of Education, standing for the principle that racial segregation
is inherently unequal and thus violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment, therefore any racial segregation in public facilities is
18
prohibited. Moreover, Johnson does not limit its decision to the
prison context, but rather broadly asserts that racial segregation is
now to be treated like any other racial classification.19
This Note first attempts to present the apparent inconsistencies
between the unique historical treatment of racial segregation in
Brown and progeny and the strict scrutiny standard imposed by
Johnson. It next examines Johnson more closely and presents four
interrelated responses that can be used to reconcile these
inconsistencies and account for the decision: (1) the court simply
failed to consider the issue; (2) the holdings in Brown and progeny
are more limited than a complete ban on racial segregation in all
public facilities; (3) an evolution in the social context and meaning
attached to racial segregation over fifty-one years has produced a
shift in the application of anticlassification and antisubordination
principles, allowing Johnson to change the standard of review; and (4)
in balancing these principles, the imposition of strict scrutiny can be
seen as a middle ground or compromise among three sets of
precedents—per se prohibition in Brown, strict scrutiny in all other
racial discrimination jurisprudence such as Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena20 and Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company,21 and the

17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. Id. at 483. There have been numerous post-Brown decisions extending the ban on
segregation past the realm of public education. See, e.g., Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964)
(ordinance requiring segregation in municipal auditorium); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61
(1963) (courtroom seating); Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (administrative regulation
requiring segregation in airport restaurant); State Athletic Comm’n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533
(1959), aff’g per curiam 168 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. La. 1958) (athletic contests); Gayle v. Bowder,
352 U.S. 903 (1956) (state-mandated segregation on buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879
(1955), vacating per curiam 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955) (municipal golf courses); Mayor of Balt.
v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), aff’g per curiam 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (public beaches
and bathhouses); Bohler v. Lane, 204 F. Supp. 168 (S.D. Fla. 1962) (separate drinking fountains,
restrooms, and entrances at public recreational facilities); Shuttlesworth v. Gaylord, 202 F.
Supp. 59 (N.D. Ala. 1961), aff’d, 310 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1962) (recreational facilities); Banks v.
Hous. Auth., 260 P.2d 668 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954)
(administrative regulation requiring segregation in public housing).
19. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 509.
20. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). The Court in Adarand applied
strict scrutiny to preferences toward minority businesses in government contracting. Id. at 226.
21. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) The Court in Croson held that a
minority set-aside program was violative of the Equal Protection Clause because appellant city
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deferential “reasonable-relationship” test with respect to other
22
fundamental rights in the prison context in Turner v. Safley. Rather
than mutually exclusive or competing theories, these reconciliations
should be seen as building blocks, each of which contributes to the
others’ validity.
I. THE BROWN DECISION: ITS CONTEXT AND ITS PROGENY
A. Preamble: The Civil War Amendments, Plessy, and Korematsu
The aftermath of the Civil War and the accompanying abolition
of slavery led to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution.23 The Fourteenth
Amendment establishes a constitutional definition of national
citizenship and forbids the states to abridge the “incidents” of such
citizenship.24 It also forbids the states to deny equal protection to any
person or to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property “without
due process of law,”25 and it grants Congress the power to enforce
26
such protection through “appropriate legislation.”
The extent to which these amendments restricted the
government from regulating or allocating by race, however, remained

failed to show a compelling interest in apportioning public contract opportunities on the basis of
race. Id. at 511.
22. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). The Court in Turner held that “when a prison
regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 89.
23. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits all forms of involuntary servitude and allows
Congress to enforce the prohibition through federal law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The
Fifteenth Amendment explicitly protects the right to vote from abridgement “on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude,” again allowing Congress to enforce such
protection through “appropriate legislation.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV. Although the Thirteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments are discussed in some of the following cases, this note will focus on
the Fourteenth Amendment, the subject of analysis in the Johnson and Brown cases. See
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–15 (2005); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489–96
(1954).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.”).
25. Id. (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
26. Id. § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.”).
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27
unsettled at the time, and “remains unsettled even now.” Following
the ratification of the three amendments, the Supreme Court
marginalized their immediate impact.28 In a series of cases known as
the Civil Rights Cases, federal statutes forbidding racial
discrimination by commercial enterprises “were held to be excessive,
as acts of an unwarranted color-blind zeal.”29 In the eyes of the Court,
“[t]he fourteenth amendment provided no basis for such
legislation . . . because that amendment reached only the
government’s own denials of equal protection, not those of private,
30
commercial parties.”
With respect to both government and private action, racial
discrimination could not be forbidden per se; the question was not
whether there was allocation on the basis of race, but rather “whether
31
the particular regulation by race was constitutionally ‘reasonable.’”
The Court’s treatment of the Civil War Amendments reflected
deference to legislative bodies to sort out benign from invidious uses
of race, and supported the view that as long as “individuals [could] be
equally protected, albeit racially regulated, then nothing in the
command or ethos of the fourteenth amendment was deemed to deny
the use of racial classification to the body of American politics.”32 This
view continued to develop through the end of the nineteenth century
and was cemented by the “separate but equal” decision of Plessy v.
Ferguson.33
In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana
statute requiring separate railway cars for blacks and whites.34

27. William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution,
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 775 (1979); see also id. at 776–77 (“The materials of enlightened
constitutional interpretation permit us . . . to treat the Constitution as repudiating the propriety
of regulating people by race or allocating among people by race, but they do not compel that
conclusion. It is oddly a matter of what we might wish to make of it.”).
28. Id. at 780–81 (“With the exception of a few notable cases striking down the most
egregious race regulations, the Supreme Court adopted a wholly tolerant and deferential
rendering of all three amendments, imputing to them only the most modest consequences.”
(footnotes omitted)).
29. Id. at 780 & nn.14–15.
30. Id. at 780.
31. Id. at 780–81.
32. Id. at 781.
33. 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
34. Id. at 542 (“That it does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished
slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for a crime, is too clear for
argument.”); id. at 550–51 (“[W]e cannot say that a law which authorizes is unreasonable, or
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Although the Fourteenth Amendment was “undoubtedly [designed]
to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law,” the
Court held, “it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions
based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political
35
equality. . . .” Examples of such allegedly lawful distinctions included
segregation of public schools36 and prohibition of intermarriage
37
between the races. The Court further held, moreover, that any
tendency of racial segregation to “stamp[] the colored race with a
badge of inferiority . . . . [was] not by reason of anything found in the
act, but solely because the colored race [chose] to put that
construction upon it.”38
Justice Harlan alone provided a vigorous dissent, rooted in a
more expansive view of the Civil War Amendments and drawn from
39
“the lessons of his own contemporary history.” The Civil War
Amendments, in Justice Harlan’s view, were about anticlassification,
40
as they “removed the race line from our governmental systems.” To
the antisubordination-based argument that the Louisiana statute was
applied equally to both whites and blacks, Justice Harlan retorted:
“Every one knows that the statute in question had its origins in the
purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars
occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches
occupied by . . . white persons.”41 “No one,” he added, “would be so
wanting in candor as to assert the contrary.”42
Taking what he deemed to be a “reasonable construction” of the
amendments, Justice Harlan advocated the anticlassification view that
the Constitution is “color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens.”43 Conceding that race pride may be expressed
to the extent that “the rights of others . . . are not to be affected,”
Harlan “den[ied] that any legislative body or judicial tribunal may
have regard to the race of citizens when the civil rights of those

more obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts . . . requiring separate schools for
colored children . . . .”).
35. Id. at 544.
36. Id. at 544 (citing Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1849)).
37. Id. at 545 (citing State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 405 (1871)).
38. Id. at 551.
39. Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 781.
40. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 557.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 559.
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citizens are involved,” for such legislation is “inconsistent not only
with that equality of rights which pertain to citizenship, National and
State, but with the personal liberty enjoyed by every one within the
44
United States.”
For almost fifty-eight years, Justice Harlan’s unrequited dissent
45
languished on the dusty bookshelves of judicial history, while the
Court continued to hold the view expressed in Plessy, that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not prevent legislative bodies from
regulating by race. State legislative bodies, without much judicial
resistance,46 continued to enact a series of race-based laws.47 The
exclusion of others based on race would remain unchallenged and
48
even unscrutinized until Korematsu v. United States.
Three years after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and in the twilight
of World War II, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a
Japanese American for violating a civilian exclusion order which
excluded all persons of Japanese ancestry from a particular
44. Id. at 554–55.
45. Of the twenty-seven cases citing Plessy between 1986 and 1954, no federal case
mentions Justice Harlan’s dissent. Only four state cases mention it. Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17,
31–32 (Cal. 1948) (granting a petition for mandamus to request the clerk issue a marriage
license to a racially mixed couple); Tyler v. Harmon, 104 So. 200, 202–03 (La. 1925) (rejecting
the plaintiff’s plea that the Fourteenth Amendment made unconstitutional a New Orleans
statute prohibiting members of different races from establishing residence in the same
neighborhoods); Commonwealth v. George, 61 Pa. Super. 412, 420 (Super. Ct. 1915) (holding
that the jury may appropriately determine whether accommodations for African Americans
were reasonable); Smith v. State, 46 S.W. 566, 569 (Tenn. 1898) (holding that a Louisiana statute
requiring segregation on a public conveyance did not violate the Interstate Commerce Clause);
see also Chesapeake & O.R. Co. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388, 395 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting
without opinion) (dissenting from the majority’s affirmation of a railway company’s conviction
for violation of a statute requiring separate cars for the races).
46. A few cases in the time leading up to Brown, however, began to erode the applicability
of the separate but equal doctrine. See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641
(1950) (“[Graduate school segregation] impair[s] and inhibit[s] [students’] ability to study, to
engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and in general to learn [their]
profession[s].”); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950) (ordering the University of Texas
Law School to admit a black student on the ground that the nearby black law school was
unequal); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 633 (1948) (per curiam) (holding that it was
unconstitutional for the only law school in the state of Oklahoma to deny the petitioner on the
basis of his race without providing him a legal education in conformity with that provided to
white Oklahoma residents).
47. See, e.g., Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908) (upholding the trial conviction
of a college for violation of a state act by willfully admitting both white and black pupils);
McCabe v. Atchison, 186 F. 966, 969 (8th Cir. 1911) (upholding an Oklahoma act requiring
racial segregation of railway cars); Hayes v. Crutcher, 108 F. Supp. 582, 584–85 (M.D. Tenn.
1952) (upholding the separate but equal doctrine with respect to public golf courses).
48. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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49
designated military area. The opinion began by noting that “all legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect.”50 Although such legal restrictions are not
unconstitutional per se, the majority continued, “courts must subject
them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may
sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism
51
never can.” Although not explicitly specifying “strict scrutiny” as the
standard of review, the court then proceeded to apply a closely
analogous level of scrutiny, assessing the compelling need for the
order52 and the narrowness of the military’s remedy.53
The judicial approval, under Korematsu, of legal restrictions that
54
“curtail the civil rights of a single racial group” was short lived,
however, as courts began to question the underlying premise of the
separate but equal doctrine.55 In the last of the Supreme Court
segregation cases before Brown, the Supreme Court implicitly
recognized the intangible disadvantages to racial segregation by
holding that once black students were admitted to an all-white school,
they could not be forced to sit in segregated areas of classrooms,
libraries, and cafeterias, as such segregation hindered the students’

49. Id. at 215–16; see Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 102 (1943) (affirming
conviction of defendant for violating curfew imposed on persons of Japanese ancestry).
50. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. See id. at 219–20 (“Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes,
except under the circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic
governmental institutions. But when under conditions of modern warfare our shores are
threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened
danger.”); id. at 219 (“[H]ardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships.”).
53. See id. at 218 (“We cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did
not have ground for believing that in a critical hour [disloyal Japanese Americans] could not
readily be isolated and separately dealt with . . . .”).
54. Id. at 216.
55. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) (“[P]etitioner may claim his full
constitutional right: legal education equivalent to that offered by the State to students of other
races. Such education is not available to him in a separate law school as offered by the State.”);
Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 633 (1948) (declaring unconstitutional Oklahoma’s
refusal to provide legal education for blacks while maintaining a white law school); Missouri ex
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349 (1938) (issuing a mandamus in favor of the petitioner,
an African-American law student who was denied entry into Missouri State University Law
School because of his race); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (declaring
unconstitutional a Kentucky law mandating racial segregation in housing). But see Fisher v.
Hurst, 333 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1948) (denying the plaintiff leave to file for a writ of mandamus
when the state responded to Sipuel by establishing a law school for blacks).
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“ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with
56
other students, and, in general, to learn [their] profession.”
B. The Brown Decision
In the 1952 Term, the Supreme Court granted review in five
cases that challenged the Plessy doctrine of “separate but equal” with
respect to public secondary education.57 The Brown Court
unanimously held that “in the field of education the doctrine of
58
‘separate but equal’ has no place.” The Court’s main difficulty in
reaching this conclusion was rooted in the clear precedent of Plessy
that segregation (and, more broadly, distinctions based on color) did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and that any alleged stigma
or “badge of inferiority” due to segregation existed in the
psychological “construction” that “colored people” placed on it.59
The Court, however, minimized the propriety of either historical
or doctrinal interpretation, choosing instead to examine the realm of
public education in light of present day national ethos, noting that
“we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We
must consider public education in the light of its full development and
its present place in American life throughout the Nation.”60 Citing
Sweatt v. Painter61 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents62 for the
proposition that some benefits of education may be intangible, the
Brown Court held that segregation of public schools, though physical
facilities and other “tangible benefits” may be equal, “deprive[s] the
children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities” in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 For support, the Court
56.
57.

McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950).
For a discussion of the consolidation of the five cases, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE
JUSTICE 540–42 (1975).
58. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
59. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
60. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492–93; see also ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 43
(1995) (“The decision did not turn on what the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought,
or on what the Court had previously held in Plessy v. Ferguson. Instead, the ideal of racial
equality had become so pressing to the Court that there was no alternative but to interpret the
Equal Protection Clause in light of its imperatives. But because this interpretation rested upon
an open avowal of a national ideal, Brown represented a courageous gamble.” (footnotes
omitted)).
61. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
62. McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950).
63. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493, 495.
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relied on “modern authority” in the form of extensive social science
64
evidence. Ignoring the strict scrutiny standard applied to racial
classifications in Hirabayashi v. United States65 and Korematsu,66 the
Brown Court held racial segregation in public schools to be a per se
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. Progeny: The Subsequent Expansion of Brown
As the Supreme Court wrestled with the implementation of
67
school desegregation in various states, it also handed down a series
of per curiam summary decisions that extended Brown past the realm
of public education and into other areas of public life.68 “In each
instance, the fulcrum of judicial leverage was an existing governmental
69
race line, which the particular judicial order sought to remove.”
Despite the controversial nature of the Brown decision, the per
curiam decisions provided no written opinions for their judgments,
but simply cited Brown as support, thus implicating the same
rationale. This piecemeal expansion of Brown to other areas of public
facilities eventually led the Supreme Court to declare that “it is no
longer open to question that a State may not constitutionally require
segregation of public facilities.”70

64. Id. at 494 n.11.
65. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 49–53.
67. See generally Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)
(addressing the issue of the federal court’s power to issue desegregation remedies); Rogers v.
Paul, 382 U.S. 198 (1965) (allowing transfers of the petitioners to schools with more extensive
curricula while the public schools desegregated at the rate of one grade a year); Griffin v.
County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (holding that the defendant may not close public schools
and open white private schools in lieu of desegregation); Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683
(1963) (prohibiting voluntary transfer provisions on the ground that they promoted
discrimination); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (ordering desegregation of the Little Rock,
Arkansas school system). But see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (limiting the power of
federal courts in imposing remedies).
68. For a list of examples of these summary decisions, see supra note 18.
69. Van Alstyne, supra note 27, at 784. Despite this characterization of Brown’s progeny,
several scholars nevertheless opine that race-consciousness in affirmative action should be
viewed differently. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 274 n.8 (1995)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“‘To pretend . . . that the issue presented in Bakke was the same as
the issue in Brown is to pretend that history never happened and that the present doesn’t
exist.’” (quoting Stephen Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 433–34
(1988))).
70. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (reversing the appellant’s conviction for
refusing to sit in the seats reserved for minorities in traffic court).
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D. Lee v. Washington: Racial Segregation in the Prison Context
The issue of racial segregation in the prison context was not
squarely addressed until 1968, when the Supreme Court affirmed, in a
per curiam opinion, a three-judge panel decision from the Middle
District of Alabama, which held that an Alabama statute requiring
racial segregation in prisons and jails violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.71 In the district court, the defendants had argued that
the practice was “a matter of routine prison security and discipline
and . . . therefore not within the scope of permissible inquiry by the
courts.”72 The district court rejected this argument, responding that
“[s]ince Brown v. Board of Education . . . and the numerous cases
implementing that decision, it is unmistakably clear that racial
discrimination by governmental authorities in the use of public
facilities cannot be tolerated.”73 The district court recognized that
there is merit in the contention that in some isolated instances
prison security and discipline necessitates segregation of the races
for a limited period . . . [h]owever . . . recognition of such instances
does nothing to bolster the statutes or the general practice that
requires or permits prison or jail officials to separate the races
arbitrarily. Such statutes and practices must be declared
74
unconstitutional in light of the clear principles controlling.

The district court then warned that “there should be no
misunderstanding on the part of any of the officials involved
concerning the duty imposed upon them . . . to cease the practice of
arbitrarily segregating the races in . . . penal facilities.”75
On appeal, the Supreme Court issued a one paragraph per
curiam affirmance of the district court’s three-judge panel decision.
The paragraph made no mention of Brown or any corresponding
standard of review, but instead neglected the issue by merely noting
that it found “unexceptionable”76 a district court opinion that failed to

71. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333–34 (1968) (per curiam).
72. Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
73. Id. at 331 (citing Johnson, 373 U.S. at 62).
74. Id. at 331–32. As an example of such an isolated instance, the district court mentioned
“the ‘tank’ used in the City of Birmingham . . . where intoxicated persons are placed upon their
initial incarceration and kept until they become sober. According to the evidence in this case,
the population of the ‘tank’ on Saturday nights in the Birmingham jail reaches fifty or more.” Id.
at 332 n.6.
75. Id. at 333.
76. Lee, 390 U.S. at 333–34.
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77
explicitly mention any standard of review. A three-Justice
concurrence clarified that “prison authorities have the right, acting in
good faith and in particularized circumstances, to take into account
racial tensions in maintaining security, discipline, and good order in
prisons and jails,” but insisted that their “explicit pronouncement [did
not evince] any dilution of this Court’s firm commitment to the
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition of racial discrimination.”78
Ultimately, aside from a weak and ambiguous three-Justice
concurrence, the Court summarily affirmed a district court opinion79
that had cited both Brown and Johnson v. Virginia, even in the prison
80
context.

II. JOHNSON V. CALIFORNIA
Thirty-seven years later, the Court again took up the issue of
racial segregation in prisons with the case of Johnson v. California.81
Johnson, an African-American prisoner in the California correctional
system, filed a pro se complaint alleging that the CDC’s policy
violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment by assigning him cellmates on the basis of his race.82 The
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s initial
dismissal, holding that “Johnson had stated a claim for racial
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”83 On
remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants on the ground that the CDC officials’ conduct, not clearly
unconstitutional, was entitled to qualified immunity.84 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed, holding that the deferential Turner v. Safley85
86
standard applied as opposed to strict scrutiny. Because Johnson did
not satisfy the burden of refuting the “common-sense connection”

77. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 539 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The
majority claims that Lee applied a heightened standard of review. But Lee did not address the
applicable standard of review.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Washington
v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
78. Lee, 390 U.S. at 334 (Black, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 333–34.
80. Lee, 263 F. Supp. at 331.
81. 543 U.S. 499 (2005). For an overview of the facts, see supra Introduction.
82. Id. at 503.
83. Id. at 503–04.
84. Id. at 504.
85. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
86. Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 798–99 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
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87
between the policy and prison violence, the policy survived the less
88
rigorous Turner standard.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals then denied Johnson’s
89
petition for rehearing en banc. A four-judge dissent disagreed,
stating that “[t]he panel’s decision ignore[d] the Supreme Court’s
repeated and unequivocal command that all racial classifications
imposed by the government must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny.”90 After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court
declared strict scrutiny to be the proper standard of review and
remanded the matter to the lower court to determine whether the
policy survives the standard.91

A. The Majority
The majority divided its analysis into two parts, the first
considering general reasons for imposing strict scrutiny in this
context, and the second explaining why the deferential standard
commonly applied to inmates’ fundamental rights did not apply in
this context. The majority first began the more general part of its
analysis by asserting that “‘all racial classifications [imposed by
government] . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
scrutiny,’”92 and that even benign racial classifications are reviewed
under strict scrutiny.93
Second, the Court noted that it had “previously applied a
heightened standard of review in evaluating racial segregation in
prisons” in Lee v. Washington.94 As evidence of the heightened
scrutiny in Lee, the Court pointed to the three-Justice concurrence
that “‘prison authorities have the right, acting in good faith and in
particularized circumstances, to take into account racial tensions in

87. Id. at 801–02.
88. Id. at 807.
89. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505.
90. Johnson v. California, 336 F.3d 1117, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003) (Ferguson, J., dissenting)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 515.
92. Id. at 505 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995))
(emphasis in Johnson).
93. Id. (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226;
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650 (1993)). Note that some Justices, notably Ginsburg, Souter, and
Breyer, disagree on this point with respect to affirmative action. See supra note 69; infra notes
118–19 and accompanying text.
94. Id. at 506 (citing Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333–34 (1968) (per curiam)).
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maintaining security, discipline, and good order in prisons and
95
jails.’”
Third, the Court rejected the idea that the government’s interest
in preventing racial violence obviated the need for strict scrutiny
because “racial classifications ‘threaten to stigmatize individuals by
reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial
96
hostility.’” By “perpetuating the notion that race matters” through
the insistence that inmates be housed with inmates of the same race,
the Court explained that prison authorities could possibly breed
further racial hostility and thus “exacerbate the very patterns of
[violence that the policy is] said to counteract.”97
Fourth, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that “[v]irtually
all other states and the Federal Government manage their prison
systems without reliance on racial segregation.”98 Moreover, the
Court noted the United States’ contention that “racial integration
actually ‘leads to less violence in BOP’s [Bureau of Prisons]
institutions and better prepares inmates for re-entry into society.’”99
Because the CDC’s policy as a racial classification is “immediately
suspect,” the Court concluded, the lower court erred in failing to
apply strict scrutiny.100
In the second part of the Court’s analysis, focusing on the
comparison of the strict scrutiny given to racial classifications with the
101
deferential Turner v. Safley standard commonly applied to inmates’
fundamental rights, the Court first distinguished Turner by insisting

95. Id. at 507 (citing Lee, 390 U.S. at 333–34); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I conclude that only those measures the State must
take to provide a bulwark against anarchy, or to prevent [imminent] violence, will constitute a
‘pressing public necessity.’”); cf. Lee, 390 U.S. at 334 (Black, J., concurring) (indicating that
protecting prisoners from violence might justify narrowly tailored racial discrimination); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“At least where
state or local action is at issue, only a social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to
life and limb . . . can justify [racial discrimination].”).
96. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 507 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643) (emphasis in Johnson).
97. Id. (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648).
98. Id. at 508–09 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 551.90 (2004)) (“[BOP] staff shall not discriminate
against inmates on the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex, disability, or political belief.
This includes the making of administrative decisions and providing access to work, housing and
programs.”).
99. Id. at 509 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
25, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (No. 03-636)).
100. Id.
101. 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (applying the “legitimate penological interest” standard to prison
policies regulating personal correspondence and inmate marriage).
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102
that it had “never applied Turner to racial classifications.” Turner
did not limit Lee, but instead had been applied “only to rights that are
‘inconsistent with proper incarceration.’”103 The right not to be
racially discriminated against, however, was not a right that need be
compromised for the sake of proper prison administration, and thus
was not “susceptible to the logic of Turner.”104 Similarly, claims of
cruel and unusual punishment were not analyzed under Turner, but
105
rather the “deliberate indifference” standard.
Second, the Johnson Court held strict scrutiny to be the proper
standard because to grant an exception to the application of strict
scrutiny to all racial classifications would “undermine [the Court’s]
‘unceasing efforts to eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal
106
justice system.’” This principle, the Court noted, has driven the
application of strict scrutiny to otherwise broadly deferential areas
107
108
such as the use of race in peremptory jury strikes and redistricting.
Third, the Court interpreted the three-Justice concurrence in Lee
to establish an exception to the color-blind principle articulated in
109
Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent. Determining whether that exception
applies, concluded the Johnson Court, requires the application of
110
strict scrutiny.
Fourth, the Johnson Court addressed Justice Thomas’s dissent,
which argued that the judgment of whether race-based policies are
necessary “‘[is] better left in the first instance to the officials who run
111
our Nation’s prisons.’” The Turner standard drawn to its logical
conclusion, the majority replied, would prove to be too lenient,

102. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510.
103. Id. (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 511.
106. Id. at 512 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 (1987) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“The Constitution abhors classifications based on race, not only
because those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but
also because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes race
relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”).
107. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 512 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89–96 (1986)).
108. Id. (comparing the partisan gerrymandering in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004)
with the racial gerrymandering in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)).
109. Id. at 512–13 (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989)).
110. See id. at 515 (“We do not decide whether the CDC’s policy violates the Equal
Protection Clause. We hold only that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review . . . .”).
111. Id. at 513 (quoting id. at 542 (Thomas, J., dissenting)); see also infra, Part II.B.1.
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allowing prison officials to use race-based policies even when they do
not advance the interest at stake, and when other race-neutral
112
policies are available. Such a standard would obviate any limitation
113
on racial segregation in prisons at all.
Fifth and finally, the majority rejected the CDC’s argument that
the application of strict scrutiny would be “‘strict in theory but fatal in
fact’” and thus prohibit the use of racial segregation under any
114
circumstance. Disagreeing with Justice Thomas’ description of the
policy as “limited,” the majority contested that the policy in fact
“applie[d] to all prisoners housed in double cells in reception centers,
whether newly admitted or transferred from one facility to
115
another.” Further, any nonracial factors taken into account were
negligible, given that the CDC admitted that the chances of an inmate
being housed with another of a different race were “‘[p]retty close’ to
zero.”116 In contrast, prison administrators still “address[ed] the
compelling interest in prison safety,” as long as they “demonstrate[d]
that any race-based policies are narrowly tailored to that end.”117
A concurrence authored by Justice Ginsburg and joined by
Justices Souter and Breyer agreed with the Court’s result and
opinion, subject to their pro-affirmative action reservation expressed
in the Gratz v. Bollinger118 dissent that “[a]ctions designed to burden
groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked
with measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched
discrimination and its aftereffects have been extirpated.”119
Disagreeing with the majority’s assertion that strict scrutiny is
necessary for all racial classifications, the concurring Justices agreed
that, as the CDC’s policy was neither necessary nor intended to
“correct inequalities,” strict scrutiny was the proper standard.120

112. 543 U.S. at 513, 514 n.3.
113. Id. at 514.
114. Id. (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)).
115. Id. at 515 n.3.
116. See id. at 514–15 n.3 (“Justice Thomas characterizes the CDC’s policy as a ‘limited’ one,
but the CDC’s policy is in fact sweeping in its application.” (internal citation omitted)).
117. Id. at 514.
118. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
119. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 516 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Gratz, 539 U.S. at 301
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
120. Id. at 516 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Herbert Wechsler, The Nationalization of
Civil Liberties and Civil Rights, Supp. to 12 TEX. Q. 10, 23 (1968)).
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B. The Dissents
1. The Thomas Dissent. Emphasizing the Turner standard of
review in opposition to the majority’s Adarand/Gratz emphasis, a
dissenting Justice Thomas noted that “[t]he Constitution has always
demanded less within the prison walls” even with respect to rights
“no less ‘fundamental’ than the right to be free from state-sponsored
racial discrimination . . . .”121
122
Describing the policy as “limited,” Justice Thomas noted that
“[f]or most of this Nation’s history . . . defendants forfeited their
constitutional rights [upon conviction and incarceration] and
possessed instead only those rights that the State chose to extend
123
them.” If the Turner standard is the Court’s “accommodation of the
Constitution’s demands to those of prison administration,” Justice
Thomas argued, then it should be applied with “uniformity,”
regardless of the constitutional claim.124
Justice Thomas next pointed out the safety concern that
“subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an
inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability
to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to
125
the intractable problems of prison administration.” Such a standard
would unnecessarily force courts to be “the primary arbiters of what
constitutes the best solution to every [prison] administrative
problem . . . .”126 Given the very real dangers of racial gang violence in
prisons,127 the CDC’s policy would survive the four factors of the
Turner test: it is “reasonably related to a legitimate penological
interest; alternative means of exercising the restricted right remain

121. Id. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia joined Thomas’s dissent. Id.
122. Id. at 525.
123. Id. at 528 (citation omitted). Justice Thomas then qualified this assertion by noting that
the Court has recently “decided that incarceration does not divest prisoners of all constitutional
protections” such as due process and free exercise of religion, see id. at 528–29, and so the initial
question for a constitutional claim is whether the prisoner even possesses the disputed right at
all, or whether it is a right that has been “divested” of him as a “condition of his conviction and
confinement,” id. at 529 n.3.
124. See id. at 531 (“[W]e should apply [Turner] uniformly to prisoners’ challenges to their
conditions of confinement.”).
125. Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
126. Id. at 531–32 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
127. See id. at 532 (“[T]here is no more intractable problem inside America’s prisons than
racial violence, which is driven by race-based prison gangs.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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open to inmates; racially integrating double cells might negatively
impact prison inmates, staff, and administrators; and there are no
128
obvious, easy alternatives to the CDC’s policy.”
After describing the broad applicability of the Turner test,
Justice Thomas then characterized the majority’s decision to use strict
scrutiny as based on both precedents and “its general skepticism of
racial classifications.”129 The majority, he insisted, was “wrong on both
scores.”130
First, Justice Thomas rejected the majority’s degree of reliance
on Lee as precedent.131 The Lee affirmance said nothing about the
applicable standard of review, as there was no need—the “wholesale
132
would have been
segregation of [Alabama’s] prisons”
unconstitutional under either strict scrutiny or a more deferential
133
standard of review.
Second, Justice Thomas rejected the majority’s main rationale
that the Turner standard applies only to rights that are “‘inconsistent
134
with proper incarceration.’” He contended that such circular logic
requires the court to have “some implicit notion of [how] a proper
prison ought . . . to be administered” in order to know “whether any
particular right is inconsistent with proper prison administration,”
which “eviscerates” Turner’s prohibition on such second-guessing in
the first place.135 In the many cases in which the Court has used
Turner regarding speech or associational rights, expanded access to
courts, freedom from bodily restraint, or free exercise rights, the
Court has “steadfastly refused to undertake the threshold standard-

128. Id. at 534.
129. Id. at 538.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 539 (“The majority claims that Lee applied ‘a heightened standard of review.’
But Lee did not address the applicable standard of review.”(citation omitted)).
132. Id. at 540.
133. See id. Even if Lee had announced a heightened standard of review for race-based
prison policies, Thomas contended that the CDC policy would have satisfied such an exception:
Johnson did not contest the “good faith” nature behind the CDC’s policy, and the policy, in its
limited scope, applied only to new inmates and transfers held in double cells in a handful of
prisons for no more than two months. Moreover, Thomas maintained that Adarand’s
application of strict scrutiny for all racial classification was inapposite, as that case, which dealt
with classifications favoring blacks, did not overrule Turner and progeny with respect to the
unique context of prisons. Id. at 540–41.
134. Id. at 541 (quoting id. at 510 (majority opinion) (citations omitted)).
135. Id. at 541–42 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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of-review inquiry that Turner settled, and that the majority today
136
resurrects.”
As for the majority’s contention that the Court has maintained a
strict burden on state actors to justify race-based policies, even in
“‘areas where those officials traditionally exercise substantial
137
138
discretion,’” Justice Thomas pointed to the Grutter case, in which
the Court deferred to the law school’s “‘educational judgment that . . .
diversity is essential to its educational mission. . . .’”139 Deference,
Justice Thomas pointed out, would seem all the more appropriate in
the penal context than the educational one, for “whatever the Court
knows of administering educational institutions, it knows much less
140
about administering penal ones.”
Finally, Justice Thomas rejected the “parade of horribles”
presented by the majority that would result from applying the
141
allegedly “toothless” Turner standard. The CDC’s policy applied
only to double cells, as opposed to dining halls, yards, etc., because
142
they were particularly difficult to monitor. If the CDC’s policy were
broader, there might be a more racially neutral means “at its disposal
capable of accommodating prisoners’ rights without sacrificing their
safety,” thus affecting one of the Turner factors.143
2. The Stevens Dissent. Justice Stevens’s dissent expressed the
opinion that the CDC’s policy should be held unconstitutional under
either level of scrutiny, rather than remanding to the lower court for
application of the strict scrutiny standard.144 The policy, Justice
Stevens wrote, “is based on a conclusive presumption that housing

136. Id. at 542.
137. Id. at 543 (quoting id. at 512 (majority opinion)).
138. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341–44 (2003) (upholding law school admissions
policy using race as a “plus” factor as a narrowly tailored and thus constitutional remedy to the
compelling interest of increasing diversity).
139. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 543 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328).
140. Id. at 543.
141. Id. at 547.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 517–23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In the final part of his dissent, Justice Thomas
disagrees with Stevens’s characterization of the evidence presented. Id. at 548 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). According to Justice Thomas, as Johnson’s arguments and the lower court rulings
concerned the application of Turner and the assumed precedence of Lee, the CDC had no
obligation to present evidence of narrow tailoring and should therefore have such opportunity
upon remand. Id. at 549–50.
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inmates of different races together creates an unacceptable risk of
racial violence” and assumes, without any individualized assessment,
that “an inmate’s race is a proxy for gang membership, and gang
145
membership is a proxy for violence.” Other prisons, both state and
federal, have been able to maintain safety and security without
“resorting to the expedient of segregation.”146 Justice Stevens thus
agreed with the majority’s remand to the lower court to resolve the
issue of qualified immunity, but dissented from the Court’s “refusal to
decide, on the basis of the record before us, that the CDC’s policy is
147
unconstitutional.”
III. ANALYSIS
Section A of this analysis points out the inconsistencies between
the Johnson Court decision and judicial precedent regarding racial
segregation as articulated by Brown and its progeny. The Court
examined whether racial segregation in prison should be reviewed
under strict scrutiny or the deferential “reasonable-relationship” test,
without even considering the outright ban on racial segregation
created in the realm of public education by Brown and subsequently
expanded in piecemeal fashion to apply to all public facilities.148
Because the Johnson majority equated segregation with all racial
classifications, it ignored the unique treatment of racial segregation
by courts since 1954. Section B of this analysis provides four
interrelated frameworks that attempt to reconcile the inconsistencies.
These reconciliations are not mutually exclusive alternative
interpretations, but rather a series of interrelated possibilities, some
of which support each other or expand on each other, and are
intended to provoke discussion. They should thus be read as a group
of possibilities, rather than a series of competing interpretations.
A. The Inconsistencies
First, the Johnson majority began by asserting that “‘all racial
classifications [imposed by government] . . . must be analyzed by a
145. Id. at 517 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 520.
147. Id. at 523.
148. See, e.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (reversing the conviction of
appellant for refusing to sit in the seats reserved for minorities in traffic court, stating that “it is
no longer open to question that a State may not constitutionally require segregation of public
facilities”).
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149
reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’” Indeed, prior to Johnson,
case law did hold that all racial classifications must be analyzed under
strict scrutiny, and this remains accepted precedent.150 This argument
does not clarify, however, why racial segregation, which has followed
its own unique track separate from other racial classifications since
Brown, should suddenly be accorded the same treatment as all other
racial classifications. The application of strict scrutiny to all racial
classifications has merit when deciding, as the Johnson opinion did,
between strict scrutiny and a lesser standard of review. It does not
explain, however, why the argument is not framed as a choice
between strict scrutiny and a complete ban.
Second, the majority relied on Lee v. Washington for the
proposition that the Court has previously applied a heightened
151
standard of review in evaluating racial segregation in prisons. As the
Thomas dissent pointed out, however, the Lee decision was a oneparagraph affirmance that made no mention of the applicable
standard of review.152 Similarly, the district court opinion lacked any
adoption of a particular standard of review—in fact, it cites Brown for
the proposition that “[s]ince Brown v. Board of Education and the
numerous cases implementing that decision, it is unmistakably clear
that racial discrimination by governmental authorities in the use of
public facilities cannot be tolerated.”153
The idea that both Lee courts applied a heightened standard of
review is not completely unwarranted. The district court did
recognize that “in some isolated instances prison security and
154
discipline necessitates segregation of the races for a limited period.”

149. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505 (majority opinion) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
150. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (“[A]ll racial classifications . . . must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny . . . .”); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94
(1989) (holding strict scrutiny as proper standard of review for a 30 percent set-aside to
minority-owned businesses in government contracting because “the standard of review under
the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a
particular classification”).
151. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 506–07 (citing Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333–34 (1968)
(per curiam)).
152. Lee, 390 U.S. at 333–34; see supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text.
153. Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (citation omitted); see id.
(“‘[It] is no longer open to question that a State may not constitutionally require segregation of
public facilities.’” (quoting Johnson, 373 U.S. at 62)).
154. Id.; see also id. at 331 n.6 (using the “drunk tank” used in the City of Birmingham as an
example of such an “isolated instance”).
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Additionally, the three-Justice Supreme Court concurrence made
explicit that “prison authorities have the right, acting in good faith
and in particularized circumstances, to take into account racial
tensions in maintaining security, discipline, and good order in prisons
155
and jails.” Although these comments may imply a carved-out
exception to the outright ban on racial segregation in public facilities,
it is not clear that such comments, absent any mention of a standard
of review, translate into the application of strict scrutiny.
Third, the Johnson majority noted the principle that “racial
classifications ‘threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their
156
membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility.’” The
proposition that racial classifications threaten to stigmatize is
undoubtedly true; indeed, the Brown court recognized the stigma
attached to racial segregation of public schools.157 Recognition of
segregation’s stigmatic effect does little, however, to support the
adoption of strict scrutiny over prohibition, and may even counsel
against it.
Fourth, the Johnson court observed that “virtually all other
States and the Federal Government manage their prison systems
without reliance on segregation.”158 Regardless of the merits of this
contention, it puts the proverbial cart before the horse. As Justice
Thomas’s dissent pointed out, the availability of race-neutral means
to control racially motivated gang violence is relevant only to the
application of the standard of review, a duty relegated to the lower
court upon remand.159 Discussion of the narrowly tailored nature of
the CDC’s policy seems circularly out of place in an opinion that
purports to decide the standard of review and then remand for
application of that standard.
Fifth, the Johnson majority emphasized that the CDC’s policy, as
an express racial classification, is “immediately suspect”160 and that

155. Lee, 390 U.S. at 334 (Black, J., concurring).
156. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 507 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993)) (emphasis in
Johnson).
157. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“To separate [schoolchildren] of
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.”).
158. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 508. But see id. at 544–45 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that
Oklahoma and Texas have adopted similar policies).
159. Id. at 544 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 542.
160. Id. at 509 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the deferential Turner test is thus inappropriate for review of racial
161
classifications. Regardless of its merits, this assertion ignores that
the threshold discussion under Brown should not be whether strict or
lesser scrutiny applies, but rather whether racial segregation in
prisons should even be tolerated at all. Indeed, according to Brown,162
Johnson v. Virginia,163 and the district court in Lee,164 racial
segregation should not be tolerated.
Finally, the Johnson v. California majority concluded that
granting the state an exemption from the rule that strict scrutiny
applies to all racial classifications would “undermine [the Court’s]
‘unceasing efforts to eradicate racial prejudice from [the] criminal
165
justice system.’” This fails again to recognize that Brown and its
progeny have created not an exemption for racial segregation, but a
complete prohibition. Even taking into account the exception in the
Lee Supreme Court concurrence, a “particularized circumstance”
which “take[s] into account racial tensions” for a “limited time” does
not necessarily equate to strict scrutiny, but indeed may suggest
something even more rigorous.166 By applying strict scrutiny to racial
segregation in prisons instead of declaring it unconstitutional, the
Court may be doing exactly what it purports to avoid—undermining
the judiciary’s “unceasing efforts” to eradicate racial prejudice from
public facilities.
B. The Reconciliations
The previous analysis points out the arguable inconsistencies
between the Johnson Court’s analytical framework and the history of
jurisprudence of racial segregation since Brown. The following points,

161. Id.
162. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (“We conclude that in the field of public education the
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal.”); see also Johnson, 543 U.S. at 506–07 (“Indeed, we rejected the notion that separate
can ever be equal—or ‘neutral’—50 years ago in Brown v. Board of Education, and we refuse to
resurrect it today.” (citation omitted))
163. See Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (“[I]t is no longer open to question that
a State may not constitutionally require segregation of public facilities.”).
164. See Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (1966) (“[I]t is unmistakably clear that
racial discrimination by governmental authorities in the use of public facilities cannot be
tolerated.”).
165. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 512.
166. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (“[P]rison authorities have the right,
acting in good faith and in particularized circumstances, to take into account racial tensions in
maintaining security, discipline, and good order in prisons and jails.”).
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however, attempt to account for these inconsistencies. Although none
of these reconciliations is alone sufficient, together they interrelate to
build upon one another. For example, the limited doctrinal view of
Brown may allow the Court to implicitly modify Brown’s reach
according to modern principles; alternatively, the ambivalent
evolution of Brown under the competing principles of
anticlassification and antisubordination may have been the driving
force behind the Court’s choice of a “middle-ground” compromise
between three precedents. One should not perceive the following
possibilities, therefore, as mutually exclusive or competing
interpretations, but rather as building blocks, some of which are
admittedly more intellectually solid than others.
1. The Court Did Not Consider the Issue. The first possibility is
that the Court simply neglected to consider the possibility that Brown
and its progeny strictly prohibited all racial segregation. Johnson did
not assert in his complaint that the CDC’s policy was prohibited
under Brown and its progeny, but rather assumed that both Lee and
Turner applied, alleging only that the CDC’s policy was not “‘related
to a legitimate penological interest.’”167 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit
failed to discuss the applicable standard of review but resolved the
168
tension between Turner and Lee in Turner’s favor. All of the amicus
briefs submitted to the Court in support of the respondent, with the
exception of that submitted by the ACLU,169 either failed to cite
170
or characterized Brown and its progeny as
Brown entirely
advocating a strict scrutiny standard.171 It is thus possible that the
Johnson Court simply addressed the issues presented before it
without considering whether the prohibition on racial segregation

167. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 548 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. California, 207
F.3d 650, 655 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)).
168. Id.; see Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 798–99 (9th Cir. 2003).
169. Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union and its Three California
Affiliates in Support of Petitioner at 13, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (No. 03-636) (“Racial
classifications are antithetical to the Fourteenth Amendment, whose central purpose was to
eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States.”) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
170. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (No. 03-636); Brief of Former State Corrections Officials as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (No. 03-636).
171. E.g., Brief for Petitioner at 44, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (No. 03-636) (“[T]he present case
is squarely governed by a specific decision of this Court which has not been overruled. Lee was
decided under the rule of strict scrutiny applied in Brown and its progeny.”).
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expressed in Brown and its progeny was relevant to the case. The
highly unlikely probability, however, that the Johnson Court wholly
forgot about one of the most famous and controversial cases in
American legal history, not to mention a year after its fiftieth
anniversary, necessitates more explanation as to why the Court did
not discuss a complete prohibition on racial classifications altogether.
2. Brown Is Doctrinally More Limited than a Complete Ban on
Racial Segregation in All Public Facilities. Another possibility is that
Brown and its progeny are more limited than a complete ban, and
have evolved into a standard similar to strict scrutiny; the Court in
Johnson simply recognized this evolution, while harmonizing
segregation with all racial classifications, by imposing a strict scrutiny
standard. The Brown decision itself was limited only to the realm of
public education.172 The expansion of Brown to other public facilities
was accomplished in piecemeal fashion by a series of summary
173
decisions in its wake. Although several cases cited Brown for the
proposition that racial segregation was prohibited in all public
facilities, the issue of racial segregation in prisons was not squarely
addressed by the Supreme Court until the Lee decision, in which the
three-Justice concurrence noted an exception to the prohibition in
“particularized circumstances.”174 In his appellate brief, Johnson
asserted that “[s]trict scrutiny is required . . . by Lee v. Washington,
part of the post-Brown v. Board of Education line of cases that the
Court and commentators have overwhelmingly understood as
requiring strict scrutiny (despite the absence of those words).”175 It
may be, therefore, that although the evolution of Brown and its
subsequent line of affirmances expanded its reach to include racial
segregation in all public facilities, the only Supreme Court case to

172. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“[I]n the field of public education,
the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”).
173. See supra note 18 (outlining this piecemeal progression).
174. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (per curiam) (Black, Harlan, & Stewart,
JJ., concurring).
175. Brief for Appellant at 6, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (No. 03-636). For support the brief cites
as examples Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995), which cited post-Brown per curiam
decisions for the proposition that “the State may not, absent extraordinary justification,
segregate citizens on the basis of race”; CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS AND THE POOR 85
(1991), in which Smith says that “[t]he Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to discriminatory
racial classifications after Brown v. Board of Education”; and Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class
Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 125 (1990), in which Simon asserts that
the application of strict scrutiny “finally culminat[ed] in Brown v. Board of Education.”
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squarely address Brown’s application in the prison context modified
its standard to allow for racial segregation in some extraordinary
circumstances. The Johnson Court’s imposition of strict scrutiny may
176
therefore formalize “particularized circumstances” as a compelling
177
interest, and “good faith” as a narrowly tailored remedy.
3. The Evolution of Brown under Anticlassification and
Antisubordination Principles. A third, intellectually comprehensive
(and perhaps the most convincing) possibility materializes when one
examines the evolution of post-Brown jurisprudence from a more
contextual approach. An insightful examination into this evolution
may be found in the work of Reva Siegel.178 In light of the values
raised by Professor Siegel’s thesis, the Johnson Court’s imposition of
strict scrutiny on the CDC’s policy may illustrate a shift in the social
meaning and stigmatic effects surrounding racial segregation, as well
as the significance of that shift in terms of application over the fiftyone years since Brown was decided.
Although courts and scholars often invoke Brown for the
principle that states are prohibited from classifying on the basis of
race, the Brown opinion, in order to overrule Plessy, relied instead on
evidence of the stigmatic and subordinative effect that segregation
has on minority schoolchildren, thus concluding that “in the field of
179
public education, the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”
As furious controversy and debate ensued over the Court’s reliance
on this social science evidence, southerners resisted attempts to
enforce Brown in other areas by insisting that such harms were not
present in other contexts, or that integration may cause greater
psychological or social harms than racial segregation.180 Amid heated
political and scholarly debate over “neutral principles” and the
181
meaning behind the Brown decision, scholars began to support a

176. Lee, 309 U.S. at 334 (per curiam) (Black, Harlan & Stewart, JJ., concurring).
177. Id.
178. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004) (exploring the
Court’s varying degrees of application of the anticlassification principle since Brown in order to
vindicate and sometimes mask shifting social concerns).
179. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 & n.11 (1954).
180. Siegel, supra note 178, at 1486–87.
181. Compare, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 33 (1959) (advocating adherence to neutral principles in constitutional
adjudication and decrying the lack of such in the Brown decision’s reasoning), with Louis H.
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“cooler” view that invalidated segregation on the more neutral basis
that racial segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause solely
182
because “race is an inherently arbitrary classification.”
This politically safer approach, the anticlassification doctrine,
encountered difficulty when the Court faced de facto segregation in
the northern school districts, where there were no facially segregative
school policies but schools were segregated nonetheless. Once again,
America wrestled with defining the principle upon which to protect
the equal rights of all citizens.183
The debate over whether the Equal Protection Clause prohibited
racial classification per se (anticlassification doctrine) or status harm
to a particular disadvantaged group (antisubordination doctrine) in
the northern de facto segregation context then found a third arena as
184
the country began to explore the contours of affirmative action.
Whereas the race-conscious assignments of the earlier desegregation
movement had been seen as benign and “licit forms of racial
classification,”185 judges now began to focus on affirmative action
measures and questioned the constitutional limits of the presumption
against racial classification with regard to race-conscious efforts to
ameliorate segregation.186 Ironically, whereas harm to minority
schoolchildren had been a driving factor in the Brown decision to end
desegregation of schools, judgments about the potential harm to
white applicants in professional school affirmative action cases were
now contributing to “courts’ newfound willingness to [interpret and
apply anticlassification principles] as a constraint on voluntary
governmental efforts to rectify racial imbalance in educational
Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 26–27 (1959) (positing principled bases behind the Brown decision).
182. Siegel, supra note 178, at 1498; see United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372
F.2d 836, 845–47 (5th Cir. 1966) (upholding federal desegregation standards in light of Brown
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Owen H. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The
Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564, 591 (1965) (“[T]he Court might have relied on
the more ‘neutral’ or ‘general’ principle that race is an inherently arbitrary classification.”).
183. Siegel, supra note 178, at 1500 (“[Q]uestions of anticlassification and questions of
group status harm were not bifurcated frames of analysis, as they would later come to be.
Anticlassification discourse acquired this new significance only as it was asked to solve a variety
of new questions in the conflicts over implementing Brown in the North.”).
184. Id. (“In the debates over de facto segregation in the 1960s, one can see
anticlassification discourse acting both to advance and to limit antisubordination aims, with the
two forms of reasoning finally assuming familiar form as agonistic principles in the affirmative
action debates of the early 1970s.”).
185. Id. at 1514.
186. Id. at 1527.
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institutions.” In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, in
which a white would-be applicant successfully challenged the
University of California at Davis medical school admissions policy,
Justice Powell attacked the antisubordinative idea of “stigma,” stating
that it “reflects a subjective judgment that is standardless,” and
argued that a deprivation to the “dominant majority” is equally
invidious.189 Although discounting the use of stigma, the Court
“compromised” by recognizing diversity as a compelling state interest
that would allow states to take race-conscious measures.190
As the previous discussion indicates, the characterization of
Brown’s legacy continues to shift over time and in the face of new
contexts. The strict anticlassification doctrine espoused by Powell in
Bakke was not the ground for the Brown decision, but rather “the
residuum of conflicts over enforcing Brown.”191 As the Court faced
numerous racial classifications in varying social contexts over time—
de jure segregation, de facto segregation, affirmative action—it
employed differing degrees of anticlassification and antisubordination
principles in light of the validity of the principle to the issue and the
social conflict surrounding it:
It was as the nation argued over Brown’s justification and
implementation that the Court began to rely on anticlassification
discourse, first to express, and then to limit, antisubordination
values. . . . [C]ourts have applied this presumption of
unconstitutionality selectively, and in a manner that has shifted over
time, to vindicate multiple and sometimes conflicting social
concerns. As we have seen, at some points in our history, claims
about the wrongs of racial classification have served to express and
to mask constitutional concerns about practices that enforce secondclass citizenship for members of relatively powerless social groups—
and at some points in our history, claims about the wrongs of racial
classification have served to diffuse and to limit expression of such
192
concerns.

187. Id. at 1529–30.
188. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
189. Id. at 295 n.34 (opinion of Powell, J.).
190. Id. at 314–15 (“As the interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a university’s
admissions program, the question remains whether the program’s racial classification is
necessary to promote this interest.”).
191. Siegel, supra note 178, at 1533.
192. Id.
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The above history and discussion highlights the evolutionary
perspective of Brown’s main principle. Although scholars continue to
struggle for a consistent, principled treatment of racial classifications,
it would be difficult to argue today that a per se ban on a sole racial
classification still exists. If post-Brown jurisprudence has revived
antisubordination values, or put differently, has reintroduced
antisubordination limitations onto what is no longer a pure
anticlassification doctrine, then equal protection is about more than
just racial classification. It must constitute some blend of
anticlassification and antisubordination values, such that any racial
classification is viewed not alone, but in light of its social meaning and
effects in today’s society. Whether stigma is taken into account or not,
when a neutral racial classification such as the CDC’s policy is
examined in light of today’s social environment as opposed to that of
the Brown world of 1954, the social meaning is necessarily different.
It was virtually unmistakable that the purpose, effect, and social
meaning of de jure racial segregation in 1954 was to maintain the
inferiority of the minority race, and the social science cited by Brown
indicated the imposition of a stigma on minority schoolchildren.
Although de facto segregation and racial discrimination in American
public schools193 continue to have a malicious grip on American
society,194 none of the segregation that persists today is of the de jure
kind seen in Plessy and Brown. Federal, state, and local governments
may no longer mandate racial segregation in schools or housing.
Interracial marriages have risen dramatically over the last few
decades, signaling a shift in the basic structure of U.S. society.195

193. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 782 (Vintage Books 2004) (1976) (noting
that the number of African Americans living at or below the poverty level, having dropped 33
percent between 1960 to 2002, was still three times higher than that for white families and that
the average income for black men had risen from 52 percent to only 68 percent of that for the
average white man between 1950 and 2002); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and
Resegregation of American Public Education: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1598
(2003) (“By 1991, the percentage of African-American students attending majority white
schools in the South had decreased to 39.2% and over the course of the 1990s this number
dropped: 36.6% in 1994; 34.7% in 1996; and 32.7% in 1998.”).
194. KLUGER, supra note 193, at 752–53 (noting the considerable social self-segregation in
the lives of private individuals and the widespread feeling that “whites, in their hearts and
minds, still viewed [blacks] by and large as their moral and intellectual inferiors . . .”).
195. See generally Michael J. Rosenfeld & Byung-Soo Kim, The Independence of Young
Adults and the Rise of Interracial and Same-Sex Unions, 70 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 541 (2005)
(suggesting that an increase in interracial and same-sex unions is partly due to the increased
geographic mobility and urban nature of today’s young adults, signaling a change in the fabric of
U.S. society as they distance themselves from the communities of their origins).
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Despite persistent socio-economic inequalities and continued racial
hostilities, the social and legal environments surrounding race
196
relations in the United States have substantially evolved since 1954.
One might therefore say that a policy by which prison authorities
segregate new prisoners by race for two months in an effort to protect
them from a perceived risk of racially motivated violence, whether
correct or incorrect, is considerably less likely to be suspected as an
“invidious use” of race classification in 2005 than it would have been
in 1954. It is no longer clear that a neutral policy of racial segregation,
although perhaps less beneficial to all due to lack of diversity, will
have a deleterious or stigmatic effect on the minority; indeed, many
brilliant and well-qualified young minorities today choose to attend
historically black colleges and universities.197 Perhaps it is because of
this changed understanding of the social circumstances surrounding
racial segregation that modern courts have felt justified in creating
exceptions to Brown’s flat prohibition on racial segregation.198
If racial segregation in 2005 is somehow perceived differently
from racial segregation in 1954 in terms of antisubordination values
such as social meaning, stigma, and effects, and if any of these values
are ones that the Court is prepared to recognize, then the “inherent
inequality” justification for Brown’s per se ban on racial segregation
is no longer accurate. Just as the Brown Court felt compelled to
“consider public education in the light of its full development and its
199
present place in American life throughout the Nation,” perhaps the
Johnson Court, considering the present place of penological
administration in today’s society, implicitly or even manifestly

196. KLUGER, supra note 193, at 752 (“Fifty years after Brown, overt displays of bigotry
were no longer socially, politically, or legally excusable. And a black presence well beyond
tokenism had been established and was thriving almost everywhere in American society to an
extent unimaginable half a century earlier—on every college campus, in corporate towers, on
job sites at all skill levels, in public service up to and including the highest reaches of
government, throughout the U.S. military, and, most visibly, in the arts, entertainment, and
sports worlds, where stellar black performers abounded.”).
197. See James A. Washburn, Note, Beyond Brown: Evaluating Equality in Higher
Education, 43 DUKE L.J. 1115, 1151–52 (1994) (citing research indicating that African-American
students tend to thrive better personally and achieve more academically at historically black
colleges and universities).
198. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992) (noting that “West Coast
Hotel [300 U.S. 379 (1937)] and Brown each rested on facts, or an understanding of facts,
changed from those which furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional
resolutions”).
199. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
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recognized a change in the understanding of circumstances that
allows for some racially segregationist policies to be justified. Perhaps
there are some racial classifications in 2005 that do not automatically
carry the same subordinative meaning, and thus do not rise to the
level of unconstitutionality. If our modern understanding of racial
segregation thus includes both an anticlassification and an
antisubordination analysis—that is, both the existence of a racial
classification and an examination of its social meaning and effects—
then a question remains as to how to weigh those different concerns.
4. The Johnson Decision Represents a Compromise between
Three Conflicting Precedents. Although racial segregation was
effectively racial discrimination in the 1950s, and courts have often
cited the principles of post-Brown jurisprudence in racial
discrimination cases, it is not axiomatic that state-mandated
segregation should be lumped into the strict scrutiny standard along
with all other forms of racial discrimination. However, the Court’s
choice, whether purposeful or reflexive, to group racial segregation
with all other racial discrimination and to impose strict scrutiny
presents the final possibility, that the Johnson court’s imposition of
strict scrutiny for racial segregation in the prison context reflects a
compromise between three conflicting lines of precedent: the outright
ban on racial segregation as initially expressed by Brown and its
progeny, the strict scrutiny applied to all racial classifications as seen
in Adarand and Croson, and the deferential treatment accorded to
prison administration by Turner. In light of the polar opposites of
Brown and Turner, supplemented only by a muddily unhelpful threeJustice concurrence in Lee, perhaps the Johnson Court’s treatment of
the CDC’s policy can be seen as a properly suspect middle ground.
CONCLUSION
Whether the Johnson Court deliberately chose to exclude a
discussion of Brown’s initially per se prohibition in order to illustrate
the evolution of the doctrine, or whether the evolution of the Brown
doctrine was so ingrained that the Court’s omission was simply
reflexive, the newly explicit strict scrutiny standard for statemandated racial segregation policies has significant implications for
civil rights litigation. These significant implications are due in large
part to the fact that the Supreme Court grouped racial segregation in
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with all forms of racial classification, without limiting such a
200
statement to the prison context.
On the one hand, the implications may be minor from an
ultimate judicial perspective—proof of a compelling interest is such a
high bar that strict scrutiny is often said to be “strict in theory, fatal in
201
fact.” After the Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz decisions, however, it is
not entirely clear that a compelling governmental interest need be an
imminent war-time emergency such as that in Korematsu; it may be as
simple as the interest of public universities in achieving diversity.202 It
is therefore imaginable that penological institutions have a
compelling interest in maintaining the safety and security of prisoners
under their custody by shielding them from the effects of racially
motivated violence.203
On the other hand, the difference between a per se prohibition
and a strict scrutiny standard, although perhaps slight from a
Supreme Court judicial perspective, becomes more significant for
lower courts and litigators. Because the Johnson Court broadly
asserted, without contextual limitation, that racial segregation is now
204
to be treated like any other racial classification, any government
policy of racial segregation would now assumedly be subject to strict
scrutiny as opposed to a per se prohibition. In the pre-Johnson world,
in which racial segregation was flatly prohibited, the government
would never have adopted a policy of racial segregation, because the
law would deem it clearly invalid. The effects of Johnson’s strict
scrutiny standard, however, free government bodies to adopt
measures that would have previously been struck down from the
start, in hopes that they can subsequently compile a record
establishing a factual basis for a claim of compelling interest.

200. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (quoting Adarand Constructors Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
201. Id. at 514 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237).
202. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
203. Even if the lower court were to find such an interest to be compelling on remand, the
CDC’s policy would still have to be sufficiently narrow, and their blind racial assignment
without any examination into history of gang affiliation or racial violence would have to be
justified.
204. See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 509 (“Because the CDC’s policy is an express racial
classification, it is ‘immediately suspect.’”). It may be worth noting that Johnson, if expanded
beyond its factual context, evokes (although not perfectly) the single-sex education case of
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), in which the Court held that Virginia failed to
provide an “exceedingly persuasive justification” under heightened scrutiny for its gender
segregation policy in education. Id. at 524.
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Conversely, it lures plaintiffs into a difficult and almost perverse
position, in which parties who are genuinely concerned with civil
rights find themselves arguing against the compelling nature of a
government’s interest in, for example, maintaining the safety of its
prisoners or providing a first class education for all children.
The absence of any discussion in Johnson v. California about the
alternative of a prohibition on state-mandated racial segregation
marks a divergence from the conventional view of post-Brown
jurisprudence. The imposition of strict scrutiny for the Department of
Corrections policy may be the delayed illustration of a historical
evolution in the Court’s balance between anticlassification and
antisubordination values, fueled by a shift in the modern societal
meaning ascribed to neutral racial classifications. Regardless of the
impetus behind the new standard of review for racial segregation in
prisons, Johnson v. California muddies the legal waters for the proper
analysis of racial segregation in other contexts, and leaves us with a
much grayer shade of Brown.

